

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W  
----- 005180

O R 081427 Z MAY 73

FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3856

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY SANAA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 JIDDA 1909

EXDIS

DEPT PASS USCINCEUR, USINT CAIRO

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, SA

SUBJ: COMMENT AND POSSIBLE RESPONSE TO KING FAISAL' S  
REPRESENTATIONS

REF: JIDDA 1891

1. INTENDED MEANING OF KING' S REMARKS TO ARAMCO OFFICERS  
AS SUPPLEMENTED BY ADHAM' S FURTHER COMMENTS SEEMS CLEAR  
ENOUGH: US INTERESTS IN ME ARE IN SERIOUS TROUBLE AND  
CAN BE DAMAGED BY PRESENT TREND OF EVENTS UNLESS THERE IS  
SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN USG POSITION. ADHAM EXPRESSED  
OPINION SADAT PROBABLY WILL RENEW HOSTILITIES AND FROM  
HIS OTHER COMMENTS WE INFER SAG WANTS US TO THINK IT WOULD  
FEEL COMPELLED JOIN OTHER ARABS IN TAKING ACTIONS ADVERSE  
TO US INTERESTS. BY REFERRING TO YAMANI' S STATEMENT TO  
WASHINGTON POST, ADHAM INDICATED SAG WAS THINKING OF OIL.

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2. KING SEEMED TO BE MAKING POINT SAUDI POLICY AND REACTIONS ARE LIABLE TO BE FORCED BY EXTERIOR EVENTS, BUT WE KNOW IN ADDITION THAT HE AND SOME OF HIS ADVISORS ( PARTICULARLY SAQQAF) ARE NOT UNAFFECTED BY TYPICAL ARAB EMOTIONS. KING' S SENSE OF FOREBODING HEIGHENED, NO DOUBT, BY RECNT ESCALATION IN ME TENSION IN WAKE OF TERRORISM BY ISRAELI RAID IN BEIRUT AND BY FEDAYEEN- GOVT CONFRONTATION IN LEBANON. BITS OF INCIDENTAL INFORMATION LEAD US TO BELIEVE SAUDIS HAVE TRIED, VIGOROUSLY TO DISSUADE SADAT FROM IDEA OF RENEWING HOSTILITIES BUT PROBABLY HAVE REFRAINED FROM GOING SO FAR AS SAYING THEY WOULD GIVE HIM NO SUPPORT IF HE DID.

3. AWARE, HOWEVER, IMPORTANCE THEIR TIES WITH USG WE SPECULATE THAT SAUDIS ( PARTICULARLY PRINCE SULTAN) WOULD BE LOATH INITIATE ANY ACTION DRASTIC ENOUGH TO FREIGHTEN 8,000- PERSON AMERICAN COMMUNITY HERE TO POINT WHERE THERE WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURES OF BADLY NEEDED TECHNICIANS OR THAT MIGHT ADVERSELY AFFECT USG' S CONTINUED WILLINGNESS SUPPORT NUMEROUS IMPORTANT SAUDI DEFENSE PROJECTS.

4. FROM FOREGOING CIRCUMSTANCE WE WOULD JUDGE THAT IF RENEWED " HOSTILITIES" CONSTITUTED NOTHING MORE THAN DESULTORY CROSS- SUEZ ARTILLERY DUEL SAUDIS MIGHT BE ABLE GET AWAY MERELY WITH STATEMENTS OR SOME MINIMAL ACTION AIMED AT SHOWING SOLIDARITY WITH ARAB CAUSE. ON OTHER HAND, SHOULD ISRAELIS LAUNCH DEVASTATING AIR RADIS AND COUNTER ATTACKS AS IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO ANY SIGNS EGYPTIAN AGGRESSIVENESS, THEN TREND OF EVENTS COULD PUSH SAUDIS INTO MUCH MORE DRASTIC MEASURES. THEY MIGHT FIND THEMSELVES UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FROM OTHER ARABS AND FROM AROUSED OPINION AT HOME TO MANIPULATE THEIR OIL RESOURCES IN MANNER THOUGHT TO BE PUNITIVE TO US INTERESTS ( AS THEY DID FOR A TIME IN 1967). A GREAT DEAL WOULD, OF COURSE, DEPEND ON HOW OTHER STATES SUCH AS SYRIA, JORDAN, ETC., REACTED. IF THESE COUNTRIES DID LITTLE OR NOTHING IN RESPONSE TO RENEWED ISRAEL- EGYPT FIGHTING, SAUDIS COULD THEN, OF COURSE, MODULATE THEIR REACTIONS ACCORDINGLY. IN SUM, WE THINK THERE WOULD DEFINITELY BE SOME SAUDI REACTION TO RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES, THAT, WHATEVER CIRCUMSTANCES,

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KING AND HIS ADVISORS, WHILE ANXIOUS PROTECT ADVANTAGEOUS ASPEC  
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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W  
----- 005196

O R 081427 Z MAY 73  
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3857  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
AMEMBSSY DHAHRAN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY SANAA

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 JIDDA 1909

EXDIS

DEPT PASS USCINCEUR, USINT CAIRO

6. IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL SAY ALSO USG KNOWS KING FAISAL HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE FULLY AWARE TERMS OUR PROPOSAL FOR INTERIM SOLUTION INVOLVING REOPENING OF SUEZ CANAL TO BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY DIRECT OR INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. WE WISH STRESS AGAIN SUCH COURSE WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE REGARDED BY US AS END OF SETTLEMENT ENDEAVORS AND THAT WE THINK SUCCESS IN REACHING INTERIM SOLUTION WOULD ESTABLISH FAVORABLE NEGOTIATING MOMENTUM WHICH COULD CARRY ON TOWARD FURTHER ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

7. MEANWHILE, IT PERHAPS WORTH REMINDING KING THERE EXIST SEVERAL OF FUNDAMENTALS OF PROBLEM WHERE USG FINDS ITSELF IN AGREEMENT WITH MANY ARAB GOVTS AND MUCH ARAB OPINION, I. E.: (A) WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT RESOLUTION 242, (B) USG CONTINUES DEEPLY CONCERNED WITH AND COMMITTED TO ACHIEVING POLICY AND COURSES OF ACTION WHICH WILL PROVIDE A JUST AND REASONABLE SOLUTION FOR PALESTINIANS, (C) US DOES NOT ACCEPT PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS IN JERUSALEM

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( WITH SOME FURTHER ELABORATION ON THIS POINT), AND ( D) US CONTINUES TO SUPPORT FULLY IDEA OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION AND OPPOSES STRONGLY ANY INFRINGEMENT, BY EITHER SIDE, OF CEASEFIRE. US POLICIES ARE NOT INFLEXIBLE, BUT WE DO BELIEVE ISSUE IS NOT SUBJECT TO SIMPLE SOLUTIONS AND THAT WE NEED TO SEE SOME REASONABLE HOPE OF ACHIEVEMENT BEFORE

UNDERTAKING MAJOR SHIFTS IN OUR POSTURE.

8. KING WILL RAISE QUESTION OF WHY US CONTINUES ITS OVERWHELMING SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL, AND I WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENTAL SUGGESTIONS ON HOW THIS POINT CAN BEST BE HANDLED.

9. KING SHOULD BE TOLD AT SAME TIME, OF COURSE, THAT WE WOULD DEEPLY DEPLORE ANY ACTIONS OR STEPS BY SAUDIS OR ANY OTHER ARAB GOVT WHICH COULD RESULT IN IMPAIRMENT OF BASIC FRIENDSHIP AND CLOSE TRADITIONAL TIES BETWEEN USG AND SAG TO WHICH BOTH SIDES ATTACH SO MUCH IMPORTANCE. IN PARTICULAR WE HOPE THAT PROSPECTS FOR PEACE NOT RECEIVE FUTHER SETBACK BY A RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES ALONG CANAL. WHATEVER PARTY RESPONSIBLE FOR RENEWED CANAL FIGHTING WOULD LOSE WORLD SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT AND WOULD SET IN TRAIN DEVELOPMENTS IN AREA THAT COULD HARM INTERESTS OF MOD - ERATES AND LEAD TO UNFORESEEABLE-- BUT CERTAINLY DELETERIOUS-- CONSEQUENCES.

10 OUR UNDERSTANDING KING INTENDS NOW DEPART FOR PARIS MAY 14, PROCEED FROM THERE TO GENEVA FOR TEN DAYS OR SO REST AND MEDICAL CHECKUP. WE HEAR MOST RECENTLY THAT KING WILL DEPART FROM JIDDA MAY 12, SPEND TWO DAYS IN CAIRO FOR CONSULTATION WITH DADAT.

11. SHOULD LATTER PROVE TO BE CASE, THEN I BELIEVE WE SHOULD TRY TO GET THROUGH TO KING FAISAL BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE, PRESUMABLY VIA FOREIGN MINISTRY, AT LEAST THE FACT THAT USG HAS BEEN FULLY INFORMED OF HIS REMARKS TO ARAMCO AND THAT THEY ARE BEING GIVEN MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON. AMB MAY BE DIRECTED CALL ON KING FOLLOWING HIS RETURN TO SAUDI ARABIA FOR FULLER EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. IF WE CAN DO THIS, WE WILL BE SEEING FAISAL OFF TO FRANCE WITH A FRIENDLY US GESTURE THAT MAY HELP

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HIM DEAL MORE SUCCESSFULLY ( IN TERMS OF OUR INTERESTS) WITH VARIOUS ATTRACTIVE POLITICAL- MILITARY OFFERS FRENCH ARE EXPECTED TO LAY BEFORE HIM.

12. AS COURTESY BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOTIFY ARAMCO HERE AND PERHAPS IN WASHINGTON ALSO OF HOW GENERALLY WE PLAN RESPOND TO KING' S MESSAGE.

13. IF DEPT COULD APPROVE MY TAKING LINE WITH KING SUGGESTED ABOVE, I MIGHT TRY FOR AUDIENCE MAY 10, LAST DAY I COULD SEE HIM BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE.  
THACHER

NOTE BY OC/ T: NOT PASSED USCINCEUR/ USINT CAIRO

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NMAFVVZCZ

\*\*\* Current Handling Restrictions \*\*\* EXDIS  
\*\*\* Current Classification \*\*\* SECRET

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** PFOR  
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**Draft Date:** 08 MAY 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** kelleyw0  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
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**Subject:** COMMENT AND POSSIBLE RESPONSE TO KING FAISAL' S REPRESENTATIONS  
**TAGS:** PFOR, SA  
**To:** AMMAN  
BEIRUT  
DHAHRAN  
KUWAIT  
LONDON  
SECSTATE WASHDC  
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TEHRAN  
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